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ABSTRACT 
 
Using a monetary endogenous growth overlapping generations model characterized by financial 
repression, purposeful government expenditures and costly tax enforcement, we analyze whether 
financial repression can be explained by the cost involved in raising taxes. Note financial 
repression is modeled via “high” obligatory reserve requirements that banks in the economy need 
to hold. We show that higher costs of tax collection produce a monotonic increase in reserve 
requirements. Moreover, the government tends to rely more on indirect taxation, compared to 
direct taxation, as costs of tax collection increases.   
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1. INTRODUCTION 
 
sing a Barro-type monetary endogenous overlapping generations model, characterized by costly tax 
enforcement and financial repression, we analyze the relationship between the costs of tax collection 
and financial repression. We follow the dominant trend in the literature
1
 in defining financial repression 
through an obligatory “high" reserve deposit ratio requirement, that the banks in the economy needs to maintain.2 
Specifically, we analyze whether the “high" reserve requirements in a closed economy characterized by costly tax 
collection, are a fall out of a welfare maximizing decision of the government, which has access to income taxation 
and seigniorage as sources of revenue.  
 
Given that the concern is not whether financial repression is prevalent, but the associated degree to which 
an economy is repressed, since developed or developing economies both resort to such restrictive policies (Espinosa 
and Yip (1996)), the pertinent question is - Why, if at all, would a government want to repress the financial system ? 
This seems paradoxical, especially when one takes into account the well documented importance of the financial 
intermediation process on economic activity, mainly via the finance-growth nexus.
3
 Besides, the fact that “high" 
cash reserve requirements enhances the size of the implicit tax base and, hence, is lucrative for the government to 
repress the financial system, alternative explanations, with varied levels of success, have ranged from: Inefficient tax 
systems (Cukierman et al (1992)) and Giovannini and De Melo (1993)) and tax evasion (Roubini and Sala-i-Martin 
(1995), Gupta (2005, 2006, 2008b) and Gupta and Ziramba (2009)) to degree of financial development (Di Giorgio 
                                                          
1See for example, Drazen (1989), Bacchetta and Caminal (1992), Haslag and Hein (1995), Espinosa and Yip (1996), Haslag 
(1998), Haslag and Koo (1999), Haslag and Bhattacharya (2001), Gupta (2005, 2006, 2008a) and Gupta and Ziramba (2008a, b, 
2009) amongst others. 
2Financial repression, though, can involve other set of government legal restrictions, like interest rate ceilings and compulsory 
credit allocation, besides, “high" reserve requirements that prevent the financial intermediaries from functioning at their full 
capacity level. However, given the wave of interest rate deregulation in the 1980s, and removal credit ceiling some years earlier, 
the major form of financial repression is currently via obligatory reserve requirements (Caprio et al. (2001)). 
3 See Roubini and Sala-i-Martin (1992), Rousseau and Wachtel (2002), Agbetsiafa (2004), Acaravci and Ozturk (2007) and Bose 
et al. (2007). 
U 
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(1999)) and asymmetric information (Gupta (2006)) and banking crisis (Gupta (2005)), besides, productive public 
expenditure (Basu (2001)) and bureaucratic corruption (Gupta and Ziramba (2008a)), currency substitution (Gupta 
(2008a) and, finally, costly of tax enforcement (Gupta and Ziramba (2008b)).  
 
In fact, the motivation for this study emanates from Gupta and Ziramba (2008b). The authors, in this study, 
using an overlapping generations model for a production economy characterized by costly tax enforcement and 
financial repression, showed that, with public expenditures affecting utility of the agents, modest costs of tax 
collection tend to result in financial repression being pursued as an optimal policy by the consolidated government. 
However, when public expenditures are purposeless, the above result only holds for relatively higher costs of tax 
collection. But, more importantly, costs of tax collection cannot produce a monotonic increase in the reserve 
requirements, what are critical, in this regard, are the weights the consumer assigns to the public good in the utility 
function and the size of the government.  
 
Our objective in this paper is not only check whether the results of Gupta and Ziramba (2008b) continue to 
hold under the assumption of endogenous growth, with the endogeneity in the growth process being obtained 
through productive public expenditure (Barro (1990)), but also, and perhaps more importantly, we would want to 
analyze if our model, by adding a supply-side to the economy, could produce a monotonic relationship between the 
reserve requirements and the costs of tax collection. This paper, thus, extends the work of Gupta and Ziramba 
(2008b). To validate our analysis, and given that the welfare optimization problem in the model is a non-linear one, 
as in Gupta and Ziramba (2008b), the theoretical model is numerically analyzed by calibrating it to a world 
economy. It must, however, be noted that our model is a general one and can be applied to any economy subjected 
to financial repression and costly tax enforcement. To the best of our knowledge, this is the first attempt to analyze 
costly tax collection as a rationale for financial repression in an economy with productive public expenditures.  
 
Alternatively, the current study can also be viewed as an analysis that looks into the optimal mix of explicit 
and implicit taxation of a consolidated government in the presence of costs of collecting direct taxation. In this 
regard, this paper is comparable to Agénor and Neanidis (2007). In this paper, the authors show that in the presence 
of positive and endogenous cost of tax collection, i.e., with the cost of tax collection depending on the resources 
spent by the government to improve monitoring of tax payers, growth-maximizing direct and (consumption) indirect 
taxation are negatively related to their respective (and cross) costs of tax collection. However, the growth-
maximizing value of the consumption tax rate is zero when collection costs do not exist, and, hence, the government 
relied completely on direct taxes. Further, with no costs of tax collection, the welfare optimizing outcome indicated 
the direct and consumption taxes to be substitutable, which was also the case with exogenous cost of tax collection. 
Finally, under exogenous costs of tax enforcement, the growth-maximizing consumption taxation was found to be 
negatively related to its “own" degree of inefficiency in collecting indirect taxation, and an increase in collection 
costs associated with direct (indirect) taxation led to a reduction (increment) in the optimal income tax rate. We, by 
adding money to the model, analyze the role of seigniorage (the implicit tax) relative to the explicit direct tax in the 
presence of cost of tax enforcement. Thus, though the main motive of our analysis is to relate financial repression 
with cost of tax collection, our study, in general, is quite similar to what Agénor and Neanidis (2007) do, especially, 
in terms of the issues, we address, on ‘optimal’ explicit and implicit taxation when there are costs involved in raising 
direct taxes. Note, our framework as well as our results, unlike that of Gupta and Ziramba (2008b), are more 
comparable to that of Agénor and Neanidis (2007), since it includes growth. The remainder of the paper is organized 
as follows: Section 2 outlines the economic environment; Section 3, 4 and 5 respectively, are devoted to defining the 
competitive equilibrium, discussing the process of calibration, and analyzing the welfare-maximizing choices of 
policy following an increase in the cost of tax collection. Finally, Section 6 concludes.  
 
2. ECONOMIC ENVIRONMENT 
 
The economy is populated by four types of agents, namely, consumers, firms, banks (financial 
intermediaries), and an infinitely-lived government. Time is divided into discrete segments, and is indexed by t  = 1, 
2,…….. There are four types of economic activities: (i) each two-period lived overlapping generations household 
(consumer/worker) is endowed with one unit of labor when young, but the agent retires when old. Thus, at time t, 
there are two coexisting generations of young and old. N  people are born at each time point t  = 1. At t  =1, there 
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exist N  people in the economy, called the initial old, who live for only one period. The population N  is 
normalized to 1. The young inelastically supplies one unit of the labor endowment to earn wage income, which is 
deposited into banks for future consumption; (ii) the banks simply convert one period deposit contracts into loans, 
after meeting the cash reserve requirements. No resources are assumed to be spent in running the banks; (ii) each 
producer is infinitely lived and is endowed with a production technology to manufacture a single final good, using 
the inelastically supplied labor, physical capital and credit facilitated by the financial intermediaries, and; (iv) there 
is an infinitely lived government which meets its expenditure by taxing income and controlling the inflation tax 
instruments -–the money growth rate and the reserve requirements. There is a continuum of each type economic 
agents with unit mass.  
 
The sequence of events can be outlined as follows: A young household works in a firm and receives wages; 
the net of tax wage income is then deposited into the banks. A bank, after meeting the reserve requirement, provides 
loan to a goods producer, which subsequently manufactures the final good and returns the loan with interest. Finally, 
the banks pay back the deposits with interest to households at the end of the first period, and the latter consumes in 
the second period.  
 
Consumers 
 
Each consumer possesses a unit of time endowment which is supplied inelastically, and consumes only 
when old. Formally the problem of the consumer can be described as follows: The utility of a consumer born at t  
depends on real consumption, 1tc   which implies that the consumer consumes only when old. This assumption 
makes computation tractable and is not a bad approximation of the real world (see Hall (1988)). Consumers have the 
same preferences so there exists a representative consumer in each generation.  
 
Formally, the agent’s problem, born in period t , is as follows:  
 
1( )t tU U c                                                                                                 (1) 
 
where U is the utility function and is twice differentiable; u    0; u    0 and (0)u = . The utility function is 
maximized subject to:  
 
(1 )t t t t tp d p w                                                                                        (2) 
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Specifically we use the following utility function:  
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where td  are the real deposits held in period t ; t  is the tax rate at period t ; tp , is the price of the consumption 
good at period t ; 1dti   is the nominal interest rate on bank deposits. Each unit of the consumption good placed into 
deposits at date t  yields 1(1 )dtr   = 
1
1
(1 )
1
dt
t
i
pi




 with 1(1 )t   = 
1t
t
p
p
  as the gross inflation rate.  
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Financial Intermediaries 
 
Financial intermediaries provide a simple pooling function by accepting deposits at the beginning of each 
period. They then make their portfolio decisions (that is, loans and cash reserve choices) with a goal of maximizing 
profits. At the end of the period, they receive their interest income from the loans made and meet the interest 
obligations on the deposits received. For simplicity bank deposits are assumed to be one period contracts. The 
intermediaries are constrained by legal requirements on the choice of their portfolio (that is, reserve requirements), 
as well as by feasibility. Given such a structure, the intermediaries obtain the optimal choice for tL  by solving the 
following problem:  
 
max b lt t dt t
L D
i L i D

                                                                                        (5) 
 
s.t. : tDt + Lt  Dt                                                                                               (6) 
 
where b the profit is function for the financial intermediary, and Mt  tDt defines the legal reserve requirement. 
tM  is the cash reserves held by the bank; tL  is the loans; lti  is the interest rate on loans, and; t  is the reserve 
requirement ratio. The reserve requirement ratio is the ratio of required reserves (which must be kept in the form of 
currency) to deposits received. To gain some economic intuition of the effect of reserve requirements on the banking 
sector, let us consider the solution of the problem for a typical intermediary. It is assumed that financial 
intermediaries behave competitively and free entry drives profits to zero,  
 
(1 ) 0lt t dti i                                                                                            (7) 
 
Simplifying, in equilibrium, the following condition must hold  
 
1
dt
lt
t
i
i



                                                                                                    (8) 
 
Reserve requirements, thus, tend to induce a wedge between the interest rate on savings and lending rates 
for the financial intermediaries.  
 
Firms 
 
All firms are identical and produce a single final good using the following Cobb-Douglas-type production 
technology:  
 
(1 )( )t t t ty Ak n g
                                                                                       (9) 
 
where A   0; 0  ((1 ))     1, is the elasticity of output with respect to capital (labor), where tk  , tn  and tg  
respectively denoting capital, labor, and government expenditure inputs at time t . At time t  the final good can 
either be consumed or stored. We assume that producers are able to convert bank loans tL  into fixed capital 
formation such that , t kt tp i L , where kti  denotes the investment in physical capital. The production transformation 
schedule is linear so that the same technology applies to both capital formation and the production of the 
consumption good and, hence, both investment and consumption good sell for the same price p . We follow 
Diamond and Yellin (1990) and Chen, Chiang and Wang (2000) in assuming that the goods producer is a residual 
claimer, that is, the producer uses up the unsold consumption good in a way which is consistent with lifetime value 
maximization of the firms. This assumption regarding ownership avoids the “unnecessary" Arrow-Debreu 
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redistribution from firms to consumers and simultaneously retains the general equilibrium structure of the models.  
 
The representative firm maximizes the discounted stream of profit flows subject to the capital evolution and 
loan constraint. Formally, the problem of the firm can be outlined as follows  
 
1 0
max [ (1 ) ]
t t
i
t t t t t lt t
k n
i
p y p w n i L




                                                           (10) 
 
kt+1  (1-k)kt + ikt                                                                            (11) 
 
ptikt  Lt                                                                                           (12) 
 
Lt  (1-t)Dt                                                                                                  (13) 
 
where   is the firm owners (constant) discount factor, and k  is the (constant) rate of capital depreciation. The 
firm solves the above problem to determine the demand for labor and investment. The firm’s problem can be written 
in the following respective recursive formulations:  
 
(1 )
1 1( ) max[ ( ) (1 )( (1 ) )] ( )t t t t t t t t t lt t k t t
n k
V k p Ak n g p w n p i k k V k   


 

                  (14) 
 
The upshots of the above dynamic programming problems are the following respective first order 
conditions.  
 
11
1 1 1
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t
g
k i p p A i
k
    

                                           (15) 
 
(1 )( ) (1 )( )tt t t
t
g
n A k w
k
                                                                             (16) 
 
Equation (15) provides the condition for the optimal investment decisions of the firm. The firm compares 
the cost of increasing investment in the current period with the future stream of benefits generated from the extra 
capital invested in the current period. And equation (16) states that the firm hires labor up to the point where the 
marginal product of labor equates the real wage.  
 
Government 
 
The government is assumed to be infinitely-lived. It purchases tg  units of the consumption good. 
Government expenditures are productive to the agents. Government expenditures are financed through income 
taxation and seigniorage. The government faces explicit costs of raising taxes,
21
2 t t
w . As in Agénor and Neanidis 
(2007), we assume these costs to be increasing with the tax rate (at an increasing rate) and the wage rate. In real per-
capita terms the government budget constraint can be written as follows:  
 
21 1
2
t t
t t t t t
t
M M
g w w
p
 

                                                                    (17) 
 
with 1(1 )t t tM M    and     0, where   is the net money growth rate and   is the cost parameter. Note, 
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the consolidated government coordinates the activities of the treasury and the central bank, both of which are 
“equally subservient to the government". The benevolent government maximizes the steady-state level of welfare 
for all future generations, obtained by substituting the equilibrium decision rules into the agents’ utility function to 
determine the optimal levels of the policy variables.  
 
3. EQUILIBRIUM 
 
A competitive equilibrium for this economy is a sequence of prices 0{ }t dt lt tp i i

  , allocations 
1 0{ }t t kt tc n i

   , stocks of financial assets 0{ }t t tm d

 , and policy variables 0{ }t t t t tg  

    such that:  
 
 The consumer maximizes utility given by (1) subject to (2) and (3);  
 
 Banks maximize profits, taking lti , dti , and t  as given and such that (8) holds;  
 
 The real allocations solve the firm’s date– t  profit maximization problem, given prices and policy 
variables, such that (15) and (16) hold;  
 
 The money market equilibrium conditions: t t tm d  is satisfied for all t  0;  
 
 The loanable funds market equilibrium condition: (1 )t kt t tp i D   where the total supply of loans 
(1 )t t tL D   is satisfied for all t  0;  
 
 The goods market equilibrium condition require: 
21
2t kt t t t t
c i g y w     is satisfied for all t0;  
 
 The labor market equilibrium condition: ( )dtn  =1 for all t  0;  
 
 The government budget is balanced on a period-by-period basis;  
 
 td , dti , Lti , and tp  must be positive at all dates.  
 
4. CALIBRATION 
 
In this section, we discuss how we assign values to the parameters of our model, based on a combination of 
figures from previous studies and those that we calibrate. The problem of the social planner is non-linear in  ,  , 
and  , and, hence, cannot be solved analytically. Numerical solution of the problem, in turn, requires values for the 
structural parameters of the model, and, hence, the calibration. Following the standard real business cycle literature, 
we use steady-state conditions to establish parameter values observed in the data. Some parameters are calibrated 
using world economy data, while others correspond to prevailing values from the literature. This section reveals the 
general procedures used.  
 
A first set of parameter values is given by numbers usually found in the literature. The following parameter 
values were chosen initially and the specific source is mentioned in the parentheses given aside, except for the 
standard ones. These are:  
 
  : the degree of risk aversion, as stated above, was set to 2;  
 
  : since the production function is Cobb-Douglas, this corresponds to the share of capital in income. The 
value chosen was of 0.70 (Basu (2001));  
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 k : the depreciation rate of physical capital was set at 0.05 or 5 percent (Zimmermann (1994));  
 
  : the annual reserve-deposit ratio was fixed at 0.15 (Haslag and Young (1998));  
 
  : tax rate was set to 0.25 or 25 percent (Chari et al. (1995));  
 
  : the annual rate of inflation was fixed at 5 percent, and, hence, the gross rate of inflation was 
1 1 05    (Basu (2001));  
 
 lti : the nominal interest rate on loans was set to 0.15 or 15 percent (Gupta (2008a));  
 
  : the discount rate, is set to 0.98 (Chari et al. (1995)).  
 
A second set of parameters are calibrated from the steady-state equations of the model to make them hold 
exactly: These parameters are:  
 
  : the cost of tax enforcement. Based on   = 25.00 percent,   = 15.00 percent, yields a value of   = 
33.66 percent, when we take into account that costs of tax collection amounts to 3 percent of total revenue 
in developing countries (Bird and Zolt (2005) and Agénor and Neanidis (2007)). We also set this value at 0 
(benchmark case), 0.05, 0.1 for the policy experiments discussed in the next section;  
 
 
g
k
: the ratio of government expenditure to capital. Given the values of  ,  ,  , and  , this was 
calibrated from the government budget constraint and has a value of 0.0714.  
  =   1(1 )(1 )(1 ) gkA        : the net growth rate which is set equal to 2.5 percent (Basu 
(2001));  
 
 1  : the gross money growth rate is calibrated using the money market equilibrium which implied that 
1   = 1     1  . This resulted in the net money growth rate to be equal to 0.076 or 7.6 percent;  
 
  : the discount factor of the firms is solved to ensure that equation (15) holds and is equal to 0.8011;  
 
 A : the value of the production function scalar, is calibrated from the equilibrium conditions to match the 
growth rate of 2.5 percent and an inflation rate of 5 percent and is equal to 0.8659.  
 
5. OPTIMAL POLICY DECISIONS 
 
In this section, we analyze the optimal policies for the government in the face of a rise in the cost of tax 
collection. For this purpose, we study the behavior of a benevolent government or social planner who maximizes the 
utility of all consumers, evaluated at the steady state, by choosing  ,   and  , following alternative values of  . 
Specifically, the problem for the social planner is captured by: 10
( )i t ii U c

   subject to inequality constraints 
  0,    1;    0,    1;    0. Furthermore, as in Basu (2001), we will assume that the government follows 
time invariant policy rules, which means that the institutionally determined tax rate, t , the cash reserve ratio, t , 
the money growth rate, t  are constant over time.  
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For deducing whether financial repression is positively correlated with the cost of tax enforcement, we start 
off with our benchmark case of   = 0. Finally, to check for the robustness of our results, we also use   = 0.05 and 
  = 0.1, besides,   = 0.3366.  
 
The results of the policy experiments have been reported in Table 1. Column 1 of the table reports the 
alternative sizes of the cost parameter. Columns 2 to 4 report the optimal values of ,   and   respectively, under 
  = 0.00, 0.05, 0.10 and 0.3366, respectively.4  
 
 
Table 1:  Optimal Policy Decisions  
Cost parameter * * * Seigniorage/tax 
=0.00 33.68 257.01 50.93 11.90 
=5.00 70.34 161.90 36.09 27.86 
=10.00 74.81 139.06 28.06 31.31 
=33.66 77.36 129.32 22.25 33.92 
(i) Parameters defined as above 
(ii) All values are in percentages. 
 
 
One can draw the following general conclusions from Table 1:  
 
 The government optimally reduces the tax rate in response to rising costs of tax collection. Note in Gupta 
and Ziramba (2008b), for   = 0, the tax rate was equal to either the share of the public good in the utility 
function or equal to size of the government, depending on whether government expenditures were useful or 
purposeless. Higher values of the cost parameter caused the optimal tax rate to fall to zero;
5
  
 
 Just as the tax rate, the money supply growth rate (rate of inflation tax) tends to fall. However, also note 
that the value of the money growth rate is always very high. This, though, is a widely observed feature in 
models analyzing welfare-maximizing policies.
6
 In the Gupta and Ziramba (2008b) framework, money 
growth rate was always optimally set at infinity in the case where public expenditure was productive, but 
was equal to zero in the case of purposeless public expenditure, until the reserve requirement became 
positive;  
 
 As the cost of tax enforcement rises, reserve requirements, or alternatively, the metric for financial 
repression, increases as part of an welfare maximizing outcome;  
 
 Importantly note, unlike Gupta and Ziramba (2008b), higher costs of tax collection produces a monotonic 
increase in financial repression. In the pure-exchange model of Gupta and Ziramba (2008b), as long as the 
tax rate was positive, the reserve requirements continued to be equal to zero. Once higher costs of tax 
collection ensured an optimal tax rate of zero, the reserve requirement moved with either the share of the 
public good in the utility function or the size of the government, depending on whether government 
expenditures were useful or purposeless ;  
 
 So, as far as, the reliance on indirect taxation, in our case seigniorage, is concerned, we show that as the 
cost of tax collection increases, the ratio of seigniorage to total revenue increases as part of an welfare-
                                                          
4The movement of the optimal policy variables continue to hold for values of   higher than 0.3366. However, given that the 
obtained value is derived from empirical evidence, we do not report our results beyond it. Further, our results were also found 
robust to alternative values of   and when we allowed only a fraction of government expenditure to be productive. 
5In Gupta and Ziramba (2008b), relatively, higher value of the cost parameter was required to produce a zero tax rate, under the 
case of purposeful public expenditures. 
6See Bhattacharya and Haslag (2001) for further details. 
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maximizing outcome. Interestingly, in Agénor and Neanidis (2007), the welfare optimizing outcome 
indicated the direct and consumption taxes to be substitutable, irrespective of whether the exogenous cost 
of tax collection was zero or positive.  
 Our results, are, however, partially comparable when we consider the case of positive and endogenous cost 
of tax collection discussed in Agénor and Neanidis (2007). The authors show that growth-maximizing 
direct and (consumption) indirect taxation are negatively related to their respective (and cross) costs of tax 
collection. However, the growth-maximizing value of the consumption tax rate is zero when collection 
costs do not exist, and, hence, the government relied completely on direct taxes. As can be seen from Table 
1, our results, indicate a positive relationship between the cost of collecting direct tax and the size of 
seigniorage to total revenue, but, unlike Agénor and Neanidis (2007), we continue to have a non-zero 
reliance on indirect taxation even when cost of tax collection for direct taxes is equal to zero. But then 
again, unlike them, our results are based on a welfare optimizing outcome. Note in Gupta and Ziramba 
(2008b) this was not the case. In that study, movements of the policy variables were not monotonic, neither 
was the ratio of indirect to direct taxation. The movement in this ratio depended crucially on the size of the 
government or the weight on the public good in the utility function.  
 
So, in summary, by incorporating a production sector, and, hence, extending the endowment economy 
model of Gupta and Ziramba (2008b), allows us to produce a monotonic positive relationship between financial 
repression and costly tax enforcement. Though note, even when there does not exist any cost of tax collection (  = 
0), the government relies on a positive level of seigniorage, and, thus positive levels of money growth rate and the 
reserve requirement, unlike Gupta and Ziramba (2008b). Further, the share of seigniorage to tax revenue continues 
to increase as the value of   increases.  
 
Intuitively, the obtained results make sense. An increase in the cost of direct tax collection, results in the 
fall in the growth rate due to a decline in the productive effect of the government expenditure, which, in turn, 
reduces welfare. The government responds by reducing the tax rate, which, in turn, boosts savings and causes higher 
growth rate and higher welfare. However, a reduction in the tax rate results in the fall of government revenue and 
tends to have a negative indirect impact on growth and welfare. To restore the size of the government revenue, the 
planner, increases seigniorage by increasing the reserve requirement. But given that increases in the reserve 
requirement tends to reduce the real interest rate on deposits and, thus, welfare, the government compensates this 
move by reducing the money growth rate, and, hence, increasing the real interest rate, in such a way that the loss in 
revenue for a reduction in the money growth rate, does not reduce growth and affect welfare indirectly. It must, 
however, be realized that all these changes occur simultaneously, and the government chooses the policy 
instruments taking into account the direct and indirect effects on welfare following an increase in the degree of 
corruption.  
 
6. CONCLUSION 
 
Using a dynamic general equilibrium overlapping generations monetary endogenous growth model of a 
financially repressed economy characterized by costly tax enforcement and productive public expenditures, we 
analyze whether the cost tax collection can result in a monotonic increase in financial repression, with the latter 
being modeled through an obligatory “high" reserve deposit ratio requirement, that the banks in the economy need to 
maintain. In other words, this study attempts to assay whether costly tax enforcement can provide a rational for 
financial repression. But more generally, the study also attempts to find the optimal-mix of monetary and fiscal 
policies of a benevolent government, following an increase in the cost of tax collection.  
 
When numerically analyzed for a world economy, the following basic conclusions could be drawn: (i) 
Unlike Gupta and Ziramba (2008b), where beyond a threshold value, positive cost of tax collection resulted in 
financial repression, but costs of tax collection and financial repression did not possess a monotonic positive 
relationship, we find a positive monotonic relationship between the two, with the government relying on a positive 
level of seigniorage, even when there is no positive costs of tax collection, and; (ii) The paper shows that a 
benevolent social planner would rely more on seigniorage relative to the income tax as the cost of tax enforcement 
increases. Clearly then, cost of direct tax collection can serve as a rationale for the existence of financial repression.  
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